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
# International Issues

REGIONAL AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS

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	INTERNATIONAL ISSUES	
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### LDC Demands at the IAEA

A proposed expansion of the International Atomic Energy Agency's Board of Governors to include a larger number of LDCs could damage the agency's reputation as a non-political, purely technical institution. The IAEA is central to the effort of the major nuclear powers to stop the spread of nuclear weapons and is relied upon to provide an objective monitoring of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Egypt, Libya, Nigeria, and Pakistan have jointly submitted a draft amendment to the IAEA governing statute that would enlarge the board, and the proposal has been placed on the agenda of the February 22 meeting of the Board of Governors. The LDCs claim that the present distribution of seats violates the principle of the sovereign equality of all members. They propose that two additional seats be allocated to the Middle East and South Asian region and that three additional seats be given to the African region. The current Board of Governors has 34 members, of which 19 are LDCs.

Any expansion of the Board of Governors would be likely to take a long time to implement: the last expansion of the board, for example, took three years to negotiate. As in other international technical agencies, the IAEA's Board of Governors--especially the members of the General Conference--are at great pains to avoid confrontations and direct votes when dealing with either technical or political issues. They tend to discuss issues at great length in an attempt to arrive at general agreement or consensus, rather than engage in the type of adversary proceedings which would lead to a clear upor-down vote. The General Conference is the only body within the IAEA that has the authority to alter the governing statute, and a two-thirds majority of voting delegations is required for passage of amendments.

The implications of the expansion proposal, however, are far-reaching. Since the Board of Governors has primary responsibility for safeguards agreements and approving the appointment of agency inspectors, any hint that its procedures are being influenced by political considerations extraneous to its technical mission might dilute its effectiveness. It is also the Board of Governors that makes the final determination of whether to bring violations of safeguards agreements to the attention of the UN Security Council and General Assembly. The agency's inspection and verification of safeguards agreements is the primary international instrument for regulating the peaceful uses of atomic facilities.

The IAEA generally, and the Board of Governors in particular, has been widely considered to be free from the "politicization" that has allegedly characterized recent proceedings of some other specialized UN agencies. At the September 1976 meeting of the General Conference in Rio de Janiero, however, the Palestine Liberation Organization was admitted as an observer group for that session, and a number of politically motivated draft resolutions were directed against South Africa's participation on the Board of Governors.\*

Earlier, in March 1976, Yugoslavia had requested that an advance meeting of nonaligned and developing countries be held (a) to urge increased technical assistance to LDCs through the IAEA and (b) to change the atmosphere and working methods of the agency in order to reduce the dominant influence of the developed nuclear (especially the military-nuclear) countries in the agency. These countries planned to oppose attempts by nuclear countries to impose stronger regulations against non-proliferation of nuclear arms, and to criticize the

<sup>\*</sup> The board seats members of the IAEA who are "the most advanced in the technology of atomic energy, including the production of source material" (article VI of IAEA Statute), and South Africa currently is the only African state that meets that criteria. African representatives—admitting political motives—at first demanded South Africa's removal from the board, but later softened that demand. They are now willing to allow South Africa to sit on the board, but not as the African representative.

purposes of the London Suppliers' Conference (which the LDCs see as a means of the DCs' strengthening their monopolistic position in this area).

In contrast to these actions, there is no indication that any of the IAEA's inspection activities or other technical functions have diminished in effectiveness or objectivity. The reactions of several important members of the present Board of Governors to the expansion proposal are negative—including those of Canada, the United Kingdom, and the USSR. The Soviets, in fact, have already expressed their dissatisfaction with the proposal to at least one current board member from the African region.

It is not yet clear whether the proposed expansion of the board is a harbinger of politicization within this agency. On the one hand, the LDCs are keenly aware of the benefits of an IAEA technical organization which is not driven by political motives. On the other hand, this proposal reflects a growing disenchantment with the efforts of the nuclear-weapons states to restrict the flow of nuclear technology to the LDCs. Many developing countries view these efforts as an affront to their national sovereignty and as another example of attempts by the industrialized countries to hold the developing states in a position of permanent economic, political, and military subordination.

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### Human Rights Implications of India's Population Policy

The more controversial enforcement aspects of India's birth control efforts apparently are at least temporarily being de-emphasized in anticipation of next month's elections. Whether or not a sterilization drive is reinstituted, the evolution of India's population policy could be a precursor of trends in other populous LDCs, and India's recent experience raises some potentially troubling questions about the relationship between population control and human rights.

As in other LDCs, India's population problems stem mainly from the failure of fertility reduction to keep pace with declining death rates. India has grown from some 360 million people in 1947 to about 630 million today. At the current 2 percent annual growth rate, India's population will pass the billion mark by the turn of the century.

At the World Population Conference in Bucharest in 1974, India was among the LDCs that stressed socioeconomic transformation and the need for a "new international economic order" over specific fertility-reduction measures and quantitative population control goals. It was the Indian delegate who coined the phrase that became the conference theme: "Economic development is the best contraceptive."

The plan of action adopted at Bucharest implicitly assumed that the "demographic transition"—the movement from high to low birth and death rates experienced by the industrialized countries in the course of their modernization—would be repeated in the LDCs. More recently, however, this assumption has increasingly been called into question. Some experts now believe the demographic transition to be no more than a description of certain past events that took place under specific—and unique—conditions. In any event, it is well recognized that individual calculations about the benefits and costs

of child bearing are what count, and that these perceptions-which are based on sociocultural as well as economic factors--may vary greatly between peoples and locales.

Indian attitudes apparently began to change significantly following the government's declaration of a state of emergency in June 1975. Previous birth control programs had not been aggressively implemented. With the Gandhi government's crackdown, however, there seemed to be an increasing realization that India's considerable agricultural and economic strides were being swamped by the tide of population growth. By last April, India had a new population policy that emphasized the use of sterilization to attack the population problem directly.

The government's strategy has involved freezing the apportionment of parliamentary representation and revenue distribution among the states on the basis of the 1971 census. The states have in turn come up with a variety of measures designed to curb their population growth. While most methods for generating sterilization candidates stop short of outright compulsion, there are formidable coercive aspects to the incentive/disincentive packages that tend to have the heaviest impact on the poorest segments of society. Pressures on civil servants for fulfillment of quotas make abuses, fraud, and disregard of official directives emphasizing volunteerism almost inevitable, and there have been a number of violent incidents related to the sterilization drive.

The Maharashtra State Family Act which was passed by the state last July would require most men under age 55 to submit to sterilization within 6 months after the birth of their third child. Noncompliance would be punishable by a 6- to 24-month jail sentence. The central government approval needed for enforcement of the act has not been forthcoming, however, probably because of Prime Minister Gandhi's reluctance to associate herself with blatantly compulsive population control measures.

Whether or not Mrs. Gandhi sheds such inhibitions after the elections, the prospects for success of the sterilization program are at best uncertain. Other populous LDCs may nevertheless be moving toward similar conclusions about their population problems, and toward coercive control measures. It should be emphasized that

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these countries would not necessarily find this to be incompatible with continued insistence on international transfers of resources and technology.

Legislative and policy guidelines preclude official US participation in compulsory foreign birth control programs, but there are broader ramifications for the US in the relationship between population policies and human rights. The International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976 and other recent amendments to the Foreign Assistance Act and related legislation restrict US security and development assistance in cases where governments engage in a "consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights."

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights--the premier statement of internationally recognized standards -- contains, in addition to more familiar civil and political rights, provisions proclaiming the right of men and women to marry and found a family, and entitling the family to the protection of society and the state. Provisions specifically endorsing the principle that the <u>size</u> of the family should be the free choice of the family itself, i.e., that "couples have a basic human right to decide freely and responsibly on the number and spacing of their children" appear in several subsequent UN proclamations. The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide-of possible relevance where minority populations are involved, as with Moslems in India--defines the imposition of measures intended to prevent birth as an act constituting genocide when committed with intent to destroy in whole or in part a national, ethnic, racial or religious group.


Whether particular population policies are compulsive or constitute consistent patterns of gross human rights violations undoubtedly will be matters subject to interpretation and debate. Mrs. Gandhi's view that "some personal rights have to be kept in abeyance for the human rights of the nation—the right to live and the right to progress" may ultimately win general international acceptance. In the meantime, however, the issue of human rights could be a troublesome complication for US policy if the population goals the US favors increasingly come to be advanced through coercive measures it finds distasteful.

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### International Terrorism in 1976

The objectives of this summary overview of international terrorism during the year just passed are first, to set the scope and nature of this activity into historical perspective, and second, to draw attention to those trends and developments that seem to be of particular import with respect to both the likely future dimensions of the problem and its impact on US interests.\*

With one exception, the charts and tables that accompany this analytical survey juxtapose terrorist statistics for 1976 against those compiled for a number of earlier years. In general, this technique serves the objective of historical perspective quite well. It must be emphasized at the outset, however, that these figures-and the inferences that can be drawn from them--should be viewed with caution. The criteria employed for selecting and classifying the incidents that have been included in these tallies are unavoidably arbitrary. Then, too, the number of incidents under review is so small that unintended omissions (of which there are undoubtedly many) or erroneous classification of borderline events could have a statistically significant impact. Finally, there is no way of telling how much of the sharp rise in recorded terrorist incidents over the past decade reflects a real increase in such activity and how much is attributable to more comprehensive and systematic reporting.

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<sup>\*</sup> For the purposes of this discussion, international terrorism is defined as the threat or use of violence for political purposes when (1) such action is intended to influence the attitudes and behavior of a target group wider than its immediate victims, and (2) its ramifications transcend national boundaries (as the result, for example, of the nationality or foreign ties of its perpetrators, its locale, the identity of its institutional or human victims, its declared objectives, or the mechanics of its resolution).

### General Observations

Regarding international terrorism, 1976 was a year in which:

- --More incidents were recorded than ever before.
- --The hijacking of commercial aircraft (which had been becoming increasingly rare) experienced a modest revival.
- --Risky and demanding kidnaping and barricade and hostage operations declined, while the safest and simplest types of terrorist action (bombing, assassination, armed assault, and incendiary attack) registered sharp increases.
- --The overall proportion of international terrorist incidents that were directed against US citizens or property dropped to a record low (25.5 percent); but in both relative and absolute terms, the burden born by US commercial facilities and their employees abroad increased markedly over 1975.
- --Cuban exile formations emerged among the most active and most disruptive terrorist groups on the international stage.
- --Latin American terrorist activity was extended to European soil.
- --The majority of the terrorist operations mounted by Palestinian groups were, for the first time since 1971, directed against Arab targets.
- --Renewed efforts to develop more effective international countermeasures against terrorist activity were launched in the Council of Europe and the United Nations General Assembly.

Last year was also notable for two things that did not happen. Despite threats that such action would be forthcoming, members of the Japanese Red Army mounted no new operations. And with very few exceptions, there was no noticeable increase in the sophistication of terrorist tactics, targeting, or weaponry.

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In the latter regard, however, it must be added that the potential threat posed by terrorist acquisition of sophisticated man-portable weaponry was brought home on at least two occasions. The first was the apprehension in late January of five members of a Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) terrorist team that was preparing to shoot down an El Al aircraft over Kenya's Nairobi airport with SA-7 missiles. The second was the theft of 15 high explosive light anti-tank weapons (LAWs) from a US army maneuver area in southern Germany later in the year.

### Specific Problem Areas

Since the Nairobi operation was thwarted in time to escape classification as a full-fledged terrorist incident, it is not reflected in the statistics presented at the end of this article. Nonetheless, because of the nationally mixed character of the PFLP terrorist team and of the extent of the support this group received from several countries (Libya, Somalia, and South Yemen), this aborted attack draws attention to the first two of the several specific problem areas that receive brief attention below.

### Transnational Cooperation

The Nairobi affair, the Entebbe hijacking, and the unsuccessful efforts of the Argentine People's Revolutionary Army (ERP) to force Buenos Aires to release an imprisoned leader of the Chilean Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) last April all document the continued trend toward greater cooperation among terrorists of different nationalities that has been observable for several years. Indeed, it seems likely that a number of factors, including the limited human resources now at the disposal of active terrorist groups in Germany and the Middle East and the increasing difficulties that have been encountered by a number of Latin American formations, made such cooperation seem increasingly advantageous as the year progressed. The initiation of more vigorous

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local countermeasures may also account in part for the spill-over of Latin American terrorist activity into the more favorable operational environment of Western Europe.\*

#### Government Support to Terrorists

As in 1975, direct governmental support of terrorist groups was most evident and most extensive with respect to small Palestinian splinter formations associated with the rejectionist wing of the fedayeen movement. Libya remained at the forefront of such activity, but there were two noteworthy new developments during the course of the year. First, two countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, Somalia and Uganda, joined Libya in actively supporting PFLP operations against Israeli targets.\*\* Second, dissatisfaction with the consequences of Syrian intervention in the Lebanese crisis brought Iraq into greater prominence on the terrorist scene as the principal patron of the Black June Movement—a small Palestinian group that is believed to have been responsible for at least nine attacks on Syrian or Jordanian targets during the last three months of 1976.\*\*\*

In general, such governmental support as was rendered to terrorist groups in the Western Hemisphere was relatively discreet. Nonetheless, there is some evidence that despite Castro's recent espousal of a Soviet-endorsed  $via\ pacifica$  strategy in Latin America, Cuba continued to provide at least three Latin American revolutionary

<sup>\*</sup> A group calling itself the Che Guevara Internationalist Brigade claimed credit for assassinating the Bolivian ambassador to France in May, the bombing of the Argentine embassy in Rome in July, and three bombings in Rome (the US Information Service and Brazilian Airlines offices and the Chilean embassy to the Vatican) in September.

<sup>\*\*</sup> Entebbe may have soured Uganda on such activity, but further collaboration between Libya, Somalia, and the PFLP seems likely.

<sup>\*\*\*</sup> The powerful bomb that exploded at Baghdad International Airport on December 14 may have persuaded the Traqis to back off temporarily. In any event, there have been no Black June Movement operations since that date.

organizations (MIR, ERP, and the ERP-sponsored Revolutionary Coordinating Junta) with both financial and training assistance.

# The Vulnerability of the Overseas Installations and Employees of US Firms

In 1975, two out of every five terrorist incidents that were directed against US citizens or facilities abroad victimized US firms or their employees. In 1976, this ratio was three out of five. The increase was partly due to the operation of such local factors as the re-emergence of Mexico's 23rd of September Communist League as an active terrorist group. But because of the tighter security measures that have been introduced at US military and diplomatic installations, the continuing lure of potentially lucrative ransom or extortion payments, and the symbolic value of US firms (e.g., as capitalistic foreign exploiters of the local working class), terrorist attacks on the US business community abroad will probably continue to grow.

Two developments during 1976 bear special note. First, the defensive measures taken by US firms continued to contribute to a shift in terrorist tactics. Thus, the number of assassinations and armed assaults have increased, while kidnapings have declined. And as American executives have gradually been withdrawn, their foreign-born replacements have been victimized in increasing numbers.

The second development stems from a single event: the assassination by local terrorists of three Rockwell international executives in Tehran on August 28, 1976. The number of victims was small, but the terrorists were eminently successful in drawing attention to the vulnerability of the burgeoning community of American civilian advisers and technicians whose skills are vital to the implementation of Iran's far-reaching programs for military modernization and economic development. Indeed, despite the fact that there have so far been no further attacks on non-official Americans in Iran, the waves that the August incident created within US business and governmental circles have yet to subside.

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# Cuban Exiles, Croatian Extremists, and the Jewish Defense League

An upsurge in international terrorist attacks mounted by groups that are either based in the US or that have strong organizational links to certain segments of the US population caused considerable difficulty and embarrassment for the US government during 1976. furor caused by the hijacking of a TWA passenger plane to Paris by Croatian extremists in September -- the most spectacular of the eight terrorist incidents attributed to Yugoslav expatriates last year--provides a case in point.\* Militants associated with the Jewish Defense League (JDL) staged at least seven attacks against Soviet, East European, Arab, and UN-connected targets in the US. (They also struck at Pan American Airlines property on two occasions, the first time to discourage that company from serving as cargo agent for Aeroflot, the second to protest its regularly scheduled flights to Syria and Iraq.)

Cuban exile groups operating under the aegis of a new alliance called the Coordination of United Revolutionary Organizations were particularly active during the second half of the year. All told, they were responsible for no less than 17 acts of international terrorism, at least three of which were in the US. Statistically, this matches the record compiled by the various Palestinian terrorist groups during the same period. But largely because the Cuban exile operations included the October bombing of a Cubana Airlines passenger aircraft, their consequences were far more bloody and far more damaging to US interests. Not only were 73 people killed when the Cubana plane went down, but the incident prompted Fidel Castro to announce that on April 15, 1977 he would terminate the 1973 US-Cuban memorandum of understanding concerning hijackers of aircraft and vessels.

<sup>\*</sup> Since its perpetrators faced almost certain capture, the TWA hijacking also illustrates the overriding importance that terrorists often attach to gaining publicity for their cause.

# Efforts to Develop New and More Effective Countermeasures

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Together with the Carlos-led raid on the OPEC ministerial meeting in Vienna in December 1975, the Entebbe hijacking played a key role in inspiring both the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism that was adopted by the Council of Europe on 10 November 1976\* and the proposal for an international convention against the taking of hostages that had been placed before the UN General Assembly by West Germany some six weeks earlier. But despite the attention that these initiatives have received, the chances that either of them will result in a significantly more effective international counterterrorist regime are rather slim.

The European convention purports to make extradition or prosecution mandatory for individuals responsible for a wide variety of terrorist acts. But at least as far as extradition is concerned, the room allowed for discretionary exceptions makes the treaty little more than a declaration of good intent. Moreover, a number of Council members, France among them, have made it clear from the outset that they view the convention with considerable reserve.\*\*

On December 9, the Legal Committee of the UN General Assembly passed a resolution directing a 35-member ad hoc committee to draft a convention against the taking of

* *	French	sensitivity	to th	e costs	that	could.	flow fro	m
ho:	ldina any	Arab terror	eist fo	r extra	dition	was d	emonstro	ited
hu	Paris! ho	astu release	of Ab	u Daud	on 11	Januar	y 1977	-
ius	st 16 days	s before it	signed	the ne	w Coun	cil of	Europe	
		ism treaty.				_		

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
Passed unanimously by the 19-member Council, the convention was opened for signature on January 27, 1977. Two member states, Malta and Ireland, have so far refused to sign it. In any event, the convention will not come into force until at least three Council members have ratified it. Thereafter, it will be binding on only those countries and such others as may subsequently complete the ratification process. It is not open to accession by nations that are not members of the Council of Europe.

hostages along lines proposed by West Germany. The echoes of the old controversy over <code>justifiable</code> versus <code>illegal</code> political violence that emerged during the debates that preceded the voting suggest that this will be no easy task. The Germans have sought to minimize the grounds for conflict by scrupulously avoiding any mention of the word terrorism in the draft text that they have prepared for the committee's consideration. Even so, it is far from certain that the group will have an agreed draft in hand by the time the next General Assembly session opens in September 1977.

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Figure 1





\*The statistics presented here and in the charts and tables that follow exclude terrorist attacks on US and allied personnel and installations in Indochina. They also exclude most of the mutual assassination efforts and cross-border operations associated with the Arab-Israeli conflict. (The only exceptions in this regard are incidents that either victimized noncombatant nationals of states located outside the principal arena of conflict or were of such a nature that they became the subject of widespread international concern and controversy.) On the other hand, related but separately targeted actions undertaken by a single terrorist group were counted as individual incidents, even when they were staged on the same day and in close proximity to one another. Similarly, terrorist operations that aborted during execution (as opposed to those that were abandoned or countered during the planning or staging phases) were also counted. Obviously, the employment of other selection criteria could yield far different results. Hence it must be emphasized that this data should be viewed as proximate.

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### INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST INCIDENTS DIRECTED AGAINST US CITIZENS OR PROPERTY 1

	KIDNAP	<u>B &amp; H</u>	BOMB	ASS'LT	$\underline{\mathtt{HIJACK}}^2$	ASSASS	INCEND	OTHER	TOTAL
1968-1976									
Total incidents	137	35	501	119	146	63	103	48	1,152
US citizens or property victimized	64	5	166	40	30	22	45	19	391
1968									
Total incidents	1	0	24	2	6	4	0	0	37
US citizens or property victimized	1	0	1	0	0	3	0	0	5
1969									
Total incidents	3	0	17	5	25	2	2	1	55
US citizens or property victimized	2	0	9	1	1	1	1	1	16
1970									
Total incidents	26	1	17	6	47	6	2	9	114
US citizens or property victimized	15	0	12	4	16	3	1 RP	5 AII 77-	56 -002
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INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST INCIDENTS DIRECTED

AGAINST US CITIZENS OR PROPERTY (CONTINUED)

	KIDNAP	B & H	BOMB	ASS'LT	$\underline{\mathtt{HIJACK}}^2$	ASSASS	INCEND	OTHER	TOTAL
1971									
Total incidents	10	1	15	8	14	3 .	6	6	63
US citizens or property victimized	4	0	12	4	7	0	5	6	38
1972									
Total incidents	11	3	38	6	16	4	3	5	86
US citizens or property victimized	1	0	18	2	3	0	1	1	26
1973									
Total incidents	34	8	81	29	15	12	20	12	211
US citizens or property victimized	18	2	34	14	0	3	12	2	85
1974			*						
Total incidents	12	9	95	24	9	8	11	11	179
US citizens or property <b>vic</b> timized	5	1	32	6	2	2	7	2	5 <b>7</b>
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# INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST INCIDENTS DIRECTED AGAINST US CITIZENS OR PROPERTY $^{1}$ (CONTINUED)

	KIDNAP	<u>B &amp; H</u>	вомв	ASS'LT	$\underline{\mathtt{HIJACK}}^{2}$	ASSASS	INCEND	OTHER	TOTAL
1975									
Total incidents	26	9	88	15	5	9	15	1	168
US citizens or property victimized	13	1	18	6	0	3	6	0	47
1976									
Total incidents	14	4	126	24	9	15	44	3	239
US citizens or property victimized	5	1	30	3,	1	7	12	2	61

I For the most part, incidents in which American citizens or property were victimized by chance have been excluded from these statistics. Examples from 1976 include the 27 June hijacking of an Air France plane (the Entebbe affair), the 11 August assault on El Al passengers at the Istanbul airport, and the 21 September bombing of the former Chilean ambassador to the United States' personal auto.

<sup>2</sup> Excludes numerous non-terrorist skyjackings, many of which victimized US aircraft.

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# BREAKDOWN OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST ATTACKS ON US CITIZENS OR PROPERTY IN 1976 BY CATEGORY OF TARGET

TARGET	NUMBE	R OF INCIDENTS
US officials (civilian or military) their property	or	7
US installations or property		15
US businessmen		3
US business facilities or commercial aircraft	L	21
Foreign employees of US firms		12
US private citizens		3
	TOTAL	61

# INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST INCIDENTS ATTRIBUTED TO CUBAN EXILE GROUPS

	KIDNAP	B & H	BOMB	ASS'LT	<u>HIJACK</u>	ASSASS	INCEND	OTHER	TOTAL
1968-1975	0	0	34	4	0	1	0	0	39
1976 <sup></sup>	0	0	12	3	0	1	0	1	17

<sup>1</sup> All but two of these incidents were staged during the second half of the year. The statistics presented exclude a few cloudy cases, e.g., the Letelier affair in September, in which Cuban exile complicity is strongly suspected.

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FEDAYEEN OR FEDAYEEN-RELATED INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST INCIDENTS BY CATEGORY

	KIDNAP	B & H	BOMB	ASS'LT	HIJACK	ASSASS	INCEND	OTHER	TOTAL
1968-1975									
Total incidents	123	31	375	95	137	48	59	45	913
Fedayeen or Fedayeen- related	8	18	48	35	19	13	3	15	159
Total incidents	14	4	126	24	9	15	44	2	220
Fedayeen or		•	120	24	ý	13	44	3	239
Fedayeen- related	0	3	3	4	2	1	4	0	17

# FEDAYEEN OR FEDAYEEN-RELATED INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST INCIDENTS BY YEAR


	<u>1968</u>	<u>1969</u>	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	TOTAL
Total incidents	37	55	114	63	86	211	179	168	239	1,152
Fedayeen or Fedayeen- related	3	10	21	10	19	46	33	17	17	176

## TARGETS OF FEDAYEEN OR FEDAYEEN-RELATED INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST INCIDENTS IN 1976 BY NATIONALITY

ARAB: 12 ISRAELI: 2 US: 1 OTHER: 2

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